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Lessons from the withdrawal of rofecoxib
Patients would be safer if drug companies disclosed adverse events before licensing
The history of the development and marketingof non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs isboth fascinating and frightening. It offers a
strange combination of stunning commercial successes
and dramatic calamities, the latest concerning the
recently withdrawn drug rofecoxib (Vioxx).1
In the 1960s research showed that salicylates were
good for pain relief in rheumatoid arthritis, but as with
steroids, their use was limited by toxicity.2 So the major
pharmaceutical companies developed non-salicylate,
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs). Over
the subsequent 40 years we have seen a procession of
new agents come and go, each one being heralded as
either more efficacious or less toxic than its competitors.
As new NSAIDs appeared, the indications steadily
broadened from inflammatory diseases to almost any
painful condition. Each time a new drug was launched
the market expanded, resulting in annual estimated sales
of more than $20bn (£11.1bn; €16.1bn) worldwide.2
The first big problem with a new NSAID occurred
in the 1980s with benoxaprofen (Opren).3 This drug,
developed by Eli Lilly, was marketed on the basis of a
unique mode of action. But it soon became clear that
its use was associated also with novel adverse events,
including photosensitivity and hepatotoxicity. The
company went on actively marketing the drug until
forced to withdraw it when several older people had
died of liver failure after using benoxaprofen.4
Now we confront a similar, but arguably more seri-
ous, problem with new NSAIDs. In the early 1990s two
isoforms of cyclo-oxygenase were discovered, with dis-
tinct patterns of expression, COX-1 and COX-2.2 The
anti-inflammatory properties of NSAIDs were said to
be related to inhibition of COX-2, whereas gastro-
intestinal adverse effects occurred because of a COX-1
inhibition5—giving remarkable emphasis to the gas-
trointestinal toxicity of NSAIDs, while largely ignoring
other adverse events.6
One of the first NSAIDs to be heavily marketed as
a COX-2 selective inhibitor, capable of efficacy without
serious toxicity, was celecoxib (Celebrex). Pfizer still
promotes this agent on the basis of the CLASS study,7
despite the fact that this pivotal trial has been discred-
ited,8 and that doubts have been cast on the selectivity
of celecoxib.2 A subsequent agent was rofecoxib
(Vioxx) produced by Merck Sharp & Dohme. While
the corresponding landmark trial, VIGOR,9 provided
robust evidence for rofecoxib’s gastrointestinal safety, it
raised concerns about its cardiovascular toxicity
(figure), including a particularly worrying increase in
the risk of myocardial infarction (relative risk 5.00, 95%
confidence interval 1.72 to 14.29).2 10
On the basis of purely theoretical reasoning—and
in the absence of any evidence from randomised
controlled trialsw1—Merck proposed that the explana-
tion for the observed difference in rates of myocardial
infarction was the cardioprotective potential of the
comparator drug used in VIGOR, naproxen.w2 A press
release on 22 May 2001 was entitled “Merck reconfirms
favorable cardiovascular safety of Vioxx.” Numerous
publications by Merck’s consultants and employees
supported this notion.w2 Now, nearly four years after
publication of VIGOR, Merck has withdrawn rofecoxib
because of its cardiovascular toxicity, quoting the results
of an as yet unpublished, placebo controlled, long term
trial as their reason for taking this action.1
We have three concerns. Firstly, the “Vioxx story”
indicates that we urgently need to determine whether
the cardiovascular effects of rofecoxib are a class effect
applicable to all COX-2 selective inhibitors—and if so,
how selective the COX-2 inhibition needs to be to have
this adverse effect. Secondly, we believe that the current
widespread use of NSAIDs for non-inflammatory pain
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Kaplan-Meier estimates for serious thrombotic cardiovascular
adverse events observed in the VIGOR trial (reference 9), which was
published in 2000 (relative risk for rofecoxib versus naproxen 2.37,
95% confidence interval 1.39 to 4.06; reference 2). Adapted from Li
Q. Statistical reviewer briefing document for the advisory committee,
2001. www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/briefing/3677b2_04_stats.pdf
(accessed 30 Sep 2004)
Additional reference w1 and w2 are on bmj.com
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has to be reconsidered. Thirdly, we must find ways of
preventing further similar episodes (box).
Single phase III drug trials are simply not big
enough to detect relatively uncommon but important
adverse events, which may affect large numbers of
people in routine clinical use.6 The potential public
health impact of previously undetected drug related
adverse events is likely to be made worse if widely mar-
keted new drugs are prescribed haphazardly and
rapidly to large numbers of people.Within five months
of the launch of rofecoxib, more than 42 000 patients
had been prescribed the drug in England,11 even
though newly marketed drugs carry a black triangle
warning, indicating an incomplete safety profile.
Unfortunately, postmarketing surveillance is not a
panacea to determine safety, as methodological flaws
may produce inaccurate results.
We therefore recommend that drug companies are
legally required to make all data on serious adverse
events from clinical studies available to the public im-
mediately after completion of the research. This will
allow independent, timely, and updated systematic
reviews of serious adverse events. In addition, we
advocate the phased introduction of new interventions
through randomised trials, which are independent from
the pharmaceutical industry and are large enough to
study rare outcomes, together with systematic, more
robust, and comprehensive approaches to pharma-
covigilance.12 Although these measures will not be
popular with pharmaceutical companies, they will limit
the numbers of patients exposed unsystematically to
unknown hazards and provide robust and unbiased evi-
dence on adverse events before a drug is licensed fully.
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The scandal of poor epidemiological research
Reporting guidelines are needed for observational epidemiology
Something surely must be wrong with epidemiol-ogy when the new editors of a leading journal inthe field entitle their inaugural offering,
“Epidemiology—is it time to call it a day?”1 Observa-
tional epidemiology has not had a good press in recent
years. Conflicting results from epidemiological studies
of the risks of daily life, such as coffee, hair dye, or hor-
mones, are frequently and eagerly reported in the
popular press, providing a constant source of anxiety
for the public.2 3 In many cases deeply held beliefs, given
credibility by numerous observational studies over long
periods of time, are challenged only when contradicted
by randomised trials. In the most recent example, a
Cochrane review of randomised trials shows that
antioxidant vitamins do not prevent gastrointestinal
cancer and may even increase all cause mortality.4 5
Now Pocock et al describe the quality and the litany
of problems of 73 epidemiological studies published in
January 2001 in general medical and specialist
journals (p 883).6 Perhaps the most relevant findings
relate to how investigators dealt with confounding,
multiple comparisons, and subgroup analyses.
Suggested measures to ensure drug safety
before definite licensing of a drug
• Legal requirement for drug companies to register all
randomised controlled trials prospectively
• Legal requirement for drug companies to make all
data on serious adverse events from clinical studies
publicly available immediately after study completion
• Continuously updated systematic reviews of adverse
events based on published and unpublished data from
randomised controlled trials and observational studies
• Phased introduction of new interventions in
independent, large scale, randomised trials before
definite drug licensing
• Clear cut financial firewalls between pharmaceutical
companies and researchers performing systematic
reviews and clinical studies
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